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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
FOR BUILDING OPTIMAL TRANSPORT TAXATION SYSTEM
ABSTRACT. The purpose of this article is to analyze the theoretical and methodolog-
ical basis of building an optimal transport taxation system. That includes establish-
ing classification criteria, functions and principles of building the system. The article 
systematizes economic views on the nature of transport taxes and outlines the genesis 
of transport taxation. The article substantiates that the genesis of studies on transport 
taxation involved the development of economic measures of the size of compensa-
tion which followed the special-to-general model, that is, from compensation for the 
use of particular road network facilities to compensation for the entirety of negative 
externalities and the use of the whole road network. The article systemizes functions 
of transport taxation and analyses its two main functions: fiscal and regulatory ones. 
The article rationalizes that the regulatory function in transport taxation is equally 
significant. The article analyzes negative external effects resulting from accelerated 
growth in car ownership. In addition, it substantiates that pure public benefits re-
lating to motor vehicle use tend to transform into mixed benefits in the course of 
mass car ownership, which, in turn, remain non-excludable, but become rivalrous in 
consumption. The work presents an original classification of transport taxes based 
on the main classification criteria. Transport taxes are classified based on types and 
designation of transport payments, stages of the life cycle of a motor vehicle, the way 
the tax is levied, the influence it has on the intensity of car use and the purpose of 
revenue spending. The work offers a system of principles of optimal transport taxa-
tion consisting of well-known and new ones. The article further develops the benefit 
principle in transport taxation as well as the social optimum principle. In addition, it 
provides definitions for original principles identified by the author: the principle of 
comprehensiveness, the principle of differentiation, the principle of payment collec-
tion at time of service, and the principle of designation. 
KEYWORDS. Transport taxation; taxes; fees; para-fiscal taxes; classification; func-
tion; principles of optimal taxation.
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ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ АСПЕКТЫ ПОСТРОЕНИЯ 
ОПТИМАЛЬНОЙ СИСТЕМЫ ТРАНСПОРТНОГО НАЛОГООБЛОЖЕНИЯ
АННОТАЦИЯ. Целью данной статьи является анализ теоретико-методологиче-
ских основ построения оптимальной системы транспортного налогообложения 
с выделением классификационных признаков, функций и принципов постро-
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ения такой системы. В работе систематизированы экономические воззрения на 
природу транспортных налогов и представлен генезис транспортного налого-
обложения. Аргументируется, что генезис исследований в области транспорт-
ного налогообложения состоял в развитии экономических обоснований величин 
компенсаций, развивавшихся по логике от частного к общему, т. е. от компен-
сации за пользование отдельными объектами дорожно-транспортной сети до 
обоснования компенсации совокупности всех отрицательных экстерналий и 
всей дорожно-транспортной сети. Систематизируются функции транспортного 
налогообложения, проводится анализ двух основных функций: фискальной и 
регулирующей. Доказывается, что регулирующая функция в транспортном на-
логообложении является паритетно значимой, анализируются отрицательные 
внешние эффекты, связанные с форсированной автомобилизацией населения. 
Кроме того, обосновывается, что чистые общественные блага, используемые при 
эксплуатации автотранспорта, в процессе массовой автомобилизации транс-
формируются в смешанные блага, которые в свою очередь сохраняют свойство 
неисключаемости, но отличаются конкурентностью в потреблении. В результа-
те исследования разработана оригинальная классификация транспортных на-
логов по основным классификационным признакам, представлены классифика-
ции по видам и характеру транспортных платежей, стадиям жизненного цикла 
транспортного средства, способу взимания платежа, характеру влияния на ин-
тенсивность использования транспортного средства и цели его использования. 
Предлагается система принципов оптимального транспортного налогообложе-
ния, включающая известные и оригинальные принципы, развиваются принцип 
выгоды в транспортном налогообложении и принцип социального оптимума. 
Сформулированы оригинальные принципы: комплексности, дифференциа-
ции, приближенности платежа к услуге, принцип маркировки.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА. Транспортное налогообложение; налоги; сборы; пара-
фискалитеты; классификация; функции; принципы оптимального налого-
обложения.
Introduction
The influence of taxes on the econom-
ic behavior of individuals and organiza-
tions is an undeniable fact. The idea of tax 
regulation of economic agents’ behavior 
was developed in the works of A. Wag-
ner, F. Quesnay, J. M. Keynes and other 
economists at the end of the 19th century, 
is still an essential tool of state social and 
economic regulation. Moreover, while at 
the early stages of development the idea 
was mainly limited to the regulation of 
distribution and consumption thus in-
fluencing economic development, now it 
encompasses all social, political and eco-
nomic goals of the state.
Transport is a specific sphere of hu-
man activity which requires active and 
immediate regulation, with the help of tax 
tools among other things. Moreover, the 
problem is vital in the sphere of afford-
able and comfortable motor transport. 
Nowadays peculiarities of motor trans-
port are determined by two trends which 
have taken shape in the last two decades. 
On the one hand, motor transport is an 
independent sector of national econom-
ics (motor transport sector) which aims 
to satisfy the demand for cargo and pas-
senger transportation. On the other hand, 
one can see accelerated development of 
the personal car fleet which aims to satisfy 
private needs. Both the motor transport 
sector and the use of private motor trans-
port aim to produce similar useful effects 
and, as achieving this effect involves the 
use of the same infrastructure, both pri-
vate and public transport tend to compete 
against each other. Growing competition 
for the use of infrastructure, road network 
and environment at the first place, results 
in numerous negative consequences [1; 2]. 
The change in requirements for the 
level and quality of transport services led 
to a slump in the transport industry in the 
late 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st 
century. Since 1990th the number of pri-
vate cars has grown fivefold and at pres-
ent there are 3 cars for every ten citizens. 
At the same time passenger traffic carried 
by motor transport dropped threefold and 
cargo turnover fell by 16 percent. A sharp 
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(almost uncontrolled) growth of private 
car ownership has resulted in increasing 
traffic congestions, limited space, intensi-
fied pollution by mobile sources and high-
er road accident rates.
One of the reasons for growing com-
petition between private and public trans-
port, and negative consequences of such a 
competition is, in our opinion, the trans-
port taxation system that has taken shape 
across the world in the last 20-30 years (it 
was introduced in Russia 15 years ago).
The purpose of this article is to analyze 
theoretical and methodological frame-
works for building an optimal system of 
transport taxation and to establish classifi-
cation criteria, functions and principles of 
building such a system.
Genesis of theoretical models relating 
to transport taxes
The history of transport taxation be-
gan in ancient times, road tolls (charges 
for passage) being the first «transport tax-
es». The use of roads and bridges called 
for the formation of specific tools of trans-
port taxation. At that time, it was not the 
vehicle itself that was taxable, but its use, 
which involved the use of certain infra-
structure. Given the absence of any theo-
retical substantiation for those mandatory 
payments, they were perceived as a charge 
for the use of road infrastructure facilities. 
Thus, the payment was a compensatory 
one and was aimed at compensating for 
the costs of construction and maintain-
ing road infrastructure. The development 
of transport infrastructure and means of 
transport led to further development of 
such fiscal tools and gradual formation of 
the system of vehicle taxes and other taxes 
incorporated into this system of mandato-
ry payments at the end of the 19th century 
[3, p. 228]. 
Theoretical studies of transport taxa-
tion issues and, first and foremost, the de-
termination of the transport tax size, did 
not begin until the middle of the 19th cen-
tury. On the one hand, economists strong-
ly criticized road charges that were pre-
dominantly chaotic and unsubstantiated 
for hampering trade. On the other hand, 
they substantiated the need for a well-
organized road network which would en-
sure strategic and economic advantages, 
including those promoting the develop-
ment of trade. The genesis of theoretical 
substantiations of transport taxation is 
shown in Fig. 1. 
In the 19th century the French School 
of Bridges and Roads (École Nationale 
des Ponts et Chaussées) was the most 
successful one in substantiating road toll 
payments. Its representatives (J. Vauban, 
J. Dupuit, M. Allais et al.) defined a tax as 
the price of public services that is set in 
terms of the marginal utility theory. Ac-
cording to them, the tax (or the toll) is an 
instrument of collecting consumer surplus 
that contributes to the funding of public 
infrastructure, while the demand for trips 
is a function of the size of the charge paid 
[4; 5]. However, it should be noted that 
representatives of the French school never 
applied those approaches to automobile 
roads and used them exclusively for the 
estimating of the cost of passing bridges, 
railways and waterways.
 
Tax (road toll) is the cost of public services the size of which is 
determined based on the marginal utility theory. It is a tool of 
collecting consumer surplus aimed at contributing to the financing 
of road network. The demand for passage is the function of toll size
Tax (road toll) is the cost of marginal negative external effects 
produced by motor transport based on the welfare theory. A tool of 
compensation of negative external costs
Tax (road toll) is the cost of use of the entire road network where 
the size of payment is set in proportion to the distance travelled. 
Payment is set based on digital control of the distance travelled. It 
must be applied to the entire automobile road network
École Nationale 
des Ponts et 
Chaussées 
(1844, J. Dupuit)
British school 
of road pricing 
(1920, А. Pigou)
American school 
of road network 
(1969, W. Vickrey)
Figure 1. Main schools working on the subject of transport taxation
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Active development of the car fleet 
at the beginning of the 20th century and 
consequences resulting from its use led to 
the formation of new methodological ap-
proaches to determining the size of trans-
port taxes presented by the British school 
of road pricing. One of its representatives, 
A. Pigou [6], suggested that transport tax-
es should be viewed as a way of internal-
izing negative externalities that occur in 
the process of automobile use. In this case, 
the size of transport taxes should reflect 
the tax price of the negative external ef-
fects so that the car owner pays them his 
money. Most of those effects are paid for 
by local governments that have to increase 
spending on road maintenance services, 
health care, emergency services and en-
vironmental services, etc. It is the imple-
mentation of the «user-pays principle» 
[7]. The studies conducted by this school 
resulted in equations which make it pos-
sible to determine the size of externalities 
on one route (road).
The approach of American economists 
became a landmark in determining the 
size of transport taxes. Studies by W. Vick-
rey in the second half of the 20th century 
were aimed at evaluating the total cost of 
road network use and compensation of 
externalities. However, unlike French and 
British schools he made evaluations not 
for particular infrastructure facilities or 
road sections but for the entire road net-
work in an urbanized territory. This ap-
proach enabled him to offer an economic 
substantiation of the size of vehicle tax as 
a function of the vehicle run time. Vick-
rey’s pioneering idea was the substantia-
tion back in the 1960s of the requirement 
that the total amount of the tax to be paid 
should be determined based on electronic 
control of mileage [8]. 
Each of the abovementioned meth-
odological approaches to transport taxes 
has a logical substantiation and was used 
to form different kinds of taxes and man-
datory payments associated with motor 
vehicles. 
Thus, the genesis of studies on trans-
port taxation involved the development 
of economic assessments of compensation 
amounts which followed the special-to-
general model, that is, from compensa-
tions for the use of particular road net-
work facilities to compensations for the 
entirety of all negative externalities and 
entire road network. It is obvious that a 
single payment does not compensate all 
kinds of negative effects and that a system 
of payments is required. 
Analysis of effects relating 
to accelerated motorization
Active studies of theoretical substan-
tiation, classification and evaluation of 
externalities relating to motor transport 
use were conducted only in the past 30 to 
40 years. American and European authors 
M. Hanson, G. McKenzie, M. Delucci, 
B. de Borger, I. Mayeres, R. Coase and oth-
ers have contributed most to the studies 
[9–11]. Russian economists started to pay 
attention to the issue of balanced develop-
ment of motor transport only in the last 10 
to 15 years.
As we know, any activity that includes 
public goods is accompanied by various 
externalities and internal costs.
Externalities are traditionally under-
stood as factors whose benefits and costs 
are not reflected in the market price of 
goods and services, unlike internal costs 
that are reflected in market prices. Conse-
quently, internal costs are covered by car 
users themselves, while externalities are 
paid for by the entire society (local com-
munity). 
Positive externalities are benefits that 
are enjoyed by a third-party as a result of 
an activity of another party without any 
pay from the former. Economic agents 
are, therefore, willing to pay for benefiting 
from positive externalities.
Negative externalities are a loss in 
the welfare of one party resulting from 
an activity of another party, without 
there being any compensation for the los-
ing party. In this case, economic agents 
are prepared to pay for avoiding negative 
externalities. 
At the same time, the market itself 
is unable to create a system of market-
based prices that would encourage pro-
ducers of negative externalities to reduce 
their impact, and consumers of positive 
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externalities to pay for the positive exter-
nal effects. Internalization of externalities 
make it possible to remedy this inability 
of the market reflect the occurring effects 
in pricing. Internalization of externalities 
is the process of incorporating externali-
ties into the market mechanism of pro-
duction that provides for their conver-
sion into internal (private) costs that are 
accounted for in prices. This process is 
sometimes referred to as correction of ex-
ternalities. 
The concept of externalities was first 
developed by Arthur Pigou [6]. He theo-
retically proved that resources are not 
distributed efficiently in the presence of 
negative externalities. Consequently, the 
state has to intervene to solve the problem 
of internalizing externalities. Such inter-
vention involves imposing a tax that is set 
equal to the negative externalities. Under 
Piguo’s concept, externalities are internal-
ized through taxation. 
R. Coase [9] approached the internal-
ization of externalities from a new angle. 
He proved a theorem stating that any 
externality can be internalized through 
the allocation of property rights. In this 
case, the inability of the market to factor 
externalities into prices is circumvented 
through the allocation of property rights 
to economic agents with the possibility of 
their further exchange. Externalities are, 
therefore, internalized through the alloca-
tion of property rights without any further 
involvement of the state. 
The Coase theorem has found its 
implementation in secondary markets of 
emissions permits. At the same time, the 
practical applications of the Coase theo-
rem are limited and the internalization of 
externalities proves impossible with inter-
vention from the state [12].
The operation of motor transport in-
volves the use of two major types of pub-
lic goods: the road network and air. The 
environment as a pure public good used 
to be considered non-excludable and non-
rivalrous. But with the development of 
technology, economics have long been 
facing the problem of a limited carrying 
capacity of the environment and the need 
to limit access to this good. 
Roads are a pure public good, too, 
that was also considered non-excludable 
and non-rivalrous until vehicle owner-
ship rates reached a certain level. Ve-
hicle ownership expansion here is un-
derstood as the process of motor vehicle 
saturation in a certain territory (region). 
Rising car ownership has aggravated 
the problem of traffic congestion. Road 
construction is lagging behind the grow-
ing amount of cars, while major cities 
have, for the most part, exhausted their 
resources for road expansion. The need 
is ripe for limiting access to this public 
good as well. 
It is possible to conclude that the 
pure public goods that are used for the 
operation of car transport are trans-
formed into impure goods as car use in-
creases and remain non-excludable, but 
become rigorous.
Positive externalities of transport are 
well known. These include labour mobil-
ity, fast shipping of goods, interregional 
cooperation and holiday and recreation 
opportunities, which leads to higher la-
bour productivity. 
At the same time, negative externali-
ties intensify as vehicle ownership ex-
pands. The impact is most prominent in 
big cities where car use increases sponta-
neously and people continue to prefer pri-
vate cars to public transport. In such cities, 
the negative externalities of motor trans-
port start to outpace the positive ones: 
traffic speed drops because of congestion; 
road accident rates go up; drivers are less 
observant of parking regulations; pedes-
trian and recreational spaces shrink to al-
low for bigger roads and parking lots; air 
quality gets worse and people’s general 
health deteriorates, and so does motorists’ 
mental health. 
Table presents the characteristics 
of the key negative externalities of car 
use that need to be corrected through 
transport tax. It has to be noted that 
the presented externalities are the ones 
that are most apparent at a higher rate 
of car ownership when a considerable 
part of the population of a territory de-
velops strong automobile dependency 
[13–15].
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Characteristics of key negative 
externalities of excessive automobile use 
in big cities
Externality Characteristics of externality 
uncompensated by car users
Pollution Damage caused by exhaust gases, 
fuel evaporations, particle pollu-
tion, costs of ill-health
Traffic 
jams
Time lost in traffic jams; addi-
tional air emissions in traffic jams 
and at lower traffic speeds 
Road ac-
cidents
Uncompensated damage to 
involved drivers; time lost by all 
travelers; uncompensated higher 
costs of emergency medical care 
and of restoring traffic after col-
lision
More 
space for 
parking 
Costs of uncompensated use 
of pedestrian and recreational 
spaces for parking, congested 
pedestrian and public transport 
traffic, esthetic degradation of 
streets and neighborhoods
More ur-
ban land 
devoted 
to roads
Costs of reallocating land in cities 
for the sake of road construction, 
higher prices of land for housing 
construction, higher cost of multi-
level interchange projects
Noise pol-
lution
Costs of building roadside noise 
barrier; costs of ill-health and 
increased irritability
Road 
wear
Costs of unscheduled road sur-
face repairs due to intense traffic, 
time lost by all travelers because 
of road closures
Classification of transport taxes
Classification of transport taxes is a 
substantiated division of transport taxes, 
fees and other mandatory payments into 
groups based on a certain distinguishing 
feature that is done for the purposes of 
systematization and comparison.
Any classification must comply with 
two important requirements:
1. Any classification must be based on 
a definite classification criterion.
2. Any classification must serve par-
ticular practical or scientific purposes, that 
is, it must be relevant to the theory and 
practice of transport taxation.
There are different classifications 
based on what is liable to tax, the source of 
taxation and kind of budgets. But we are 
going to focus on six most relevant clas-
sifications of transport taxes (Fig. 2) which 
are essential for the purposes of analysis 
and comparison.
1. Classification by type of levy. The 
system of transport taxation in any coun-
try is made up of levies which vary in their 
legal nature: taxes, excise taxes and duties, 
non-tax (fiscal) levies, para-fiscal taxes. 
Such diversity is needed to make the sys-
tem of transport taxation more flexible as 
regards the legal regulation and spending 
of revenue from the levies. 
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6
Type of mandatory 
payment
Designation
of payment
Life cycle of motor 
vehicle
How it influences 
the intensity of 
motor vehicle use
How tax is 
collected
Purpose of motor 
vehicle use
Taxes
Tax levies
Non-tax levies
Para-fiscal taxes
Abstract (non-targeted) payments
Targeted payments
Fees charged at production stage
Fees charged in the process of use
Fees charged at the scrappage stage
Fixed payments irrespective of intensity of use
Variable payments dependent on the 
intensity of use
Fees passed on to transport vehicle owner
Payments regularly made by car owner
Fees levied at «toll gate» (at the moment of 
providing a service)
Payments made for non-commercial 
(private) use
Payments made for commercial use of motor 
vehicle
Figure 2. Main classifications of mandatory transport-related payments
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Essentially, the levy (excise) as a tax 
payment differ from the fiscal levy (duty) 
as a non-tax one in that they are propor-
tioned differently to the cost of the ser-
vice (or rights) provided by the state. The 
general rule says that the size of the fis-
cal levy has a compensatory role, that is, 
its size offsets the monetary value of the 
taxable matter (for example, payments 
for a negative impact on the environment 
which offset monetary value of damage 
caused by airborne pollutants), or provide 
state with the compensation for the cost of 
service which was provided (for example, 
the cost of producing and issuing license 
plates). Consequently, the size of a fiscal 
levy should match the size of the benefit 
got by the payer, or be equal to the cost of 
service provided to the payer.
To sum up, the enforcement of the 
state’s monopoly on certain actions or 
services for car owners should be coupled 
with the payment of a tax, its size doesn’t 
depend on the costs that the state bears. 
A fiscal levy should be introduced as a 
charge for a service (a parking fee, a toll 
for passing a bridge) and its size should 
correspond to the appropriate costs in-
curred on the state, or to the special ben-
efit got by the payer; the levy should be 
designated for a specific purpose and be 
remitted to extra-budgetary funds. Para-
fiscal taxes, fulfill their compensatory role 
as well (truck tolls being an example here). 
They also have a targeted function, but 
can be regulated by by-laws and remitted 
to legal entities of public law or legal enti-
ties of private law [16, p. 113]. 
2. Classification by the nature of levy. 
The purpose of this classification is to sep-
arate revenue from transport taxes accord-
ing to the objectives of spending.
Abstract (non-targeted) taxes are 
transport taxes and fees revenue from 
which is accumulated in a budget, lose 
their tagging and are spent on gen-
eral purposes in line with the budget 
priorities.
Targeted taxes are transport taxes, 
fees and para-fiscal taxes that are strictly 
designated for specific expenditures that 
have to do with road maintenance and the 
development of the road network and in-
frastructure.
Giving a designation to payments in 
transport taxation provides strategic ad-
vantages as that makes it possible to form 
targeted sources of funding for road funds 
on a long term basis and to make car own-
ers more interested in paying them. 
3. Classification by stages of vehicle 
life cycle. We define the lifecycle of a ve-
hicle as the period of time between its 
production and its scrappage [17]. Con-
sequently, the period can be divided into 
three main stages: production, use, and 
scrappage. We suggest classifying all pay-
ments according to each stage of the ve-
hicle lifecycle (Fig. 3).
The classification makes it possible 
to differentiate tax burdens at each life-
cycle stage, shifting the tax load to the 
stage of use.
4. Classification by impact on the in-
tensity of vehicle use. The classification di-
vides all taxes and levies into two groups.
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ScrappageUseProduction
Value added tax
Car sales excise 
taxes
Registration fees
Motor fuel excise tax Recycling fee
Vehicle tax
Parking fee
Tolls
Truck tolls
Figure 3. Types of fiscal payments in Russia at various vehicle lifecycle stages
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Fixed taxes. The tax rates are not 
pegged to the intensity of car use, which 
means they do not directly involve car 
owner in the process of negative externali-
ties compensation. Yet their size is a deter-
mining factor in the affordability of a car; 
it influences the level of car ownership 
in society and the desire (of individuals 
at the first place) to own a vehicle. High 
fixed taxes could be used as an instru-
ment of shutting out some people (usually 
those with low income) from owning a 
car and, consequently, from driving one. 
Theory-wise, fixed taxes are essentially 
Ramsey taxes and ensure certain tax rev-
enues for the government from car own-
ers [11; 13; 18].
The amount of variable taxes which is 
determined by the intensity of car use. In 
this case, the size of transport taxes should 
reflect the tax price of negative externali-
ties, while each car owner should pay an 
amount that is equivalent to the total of 
negative externalities caused by the op-
eration of his/her car. A sophisticated 
system of variable taxes makes it possible 
to effectively administer the process of 
recovering marginal external costs while 
precisely factoring in all kinds of impact. 
Foreign studies show that in the case of 
the absence of fixed transport taxes, the 
amount of variable taxes is higher than 
marginal external costs. This makes it 
possible to also ensure a positive Ramsey 
component in taxes. From the theoretical 
perspective, these groups of taxes are Pig-
ouvian taxes [13; 18].
In Russia, fixed transport taxes include 
value added tax (VAT), stamp fee on the 
purchase of a vehicle, registration fees, re-
cycling fee, and annually paid vehicle tax. 
In Russia, variable taxes include fuel excise 
duties, parking fee, tolls, truck tolls. 
5. Classification by method of tax 
collection. The classification is important 
for the purposes of analyzing technical 
arrangements for the system of transport 
taxation and, most importantly, it is essen-
tial for the purposes of functional analysis.
Tax payments that passed on to the owner 
of the vehicle. Such taxes and duties are 
paid by the manufacturer (of a motor ve-
hicle, petrol, motor oil, spare parts) and 
are then shifted onto the consumer as part 
of the price. The payments are primarily 
used for the purposes of government rev-
enue collection. Their role as a regulatory 
factor is insignificant because these taxes 
are hidden in the price and consumers do 
not observe them as relevant signals. 
Tax payments that are made directly by 
the owner. Such payments have proper 
fiscal and regulatory potential. Payments 
that are contributed by the owner of a 
motor vehicle on a monthly, quarterly or 
yearly basis are fully felt by him or her. 
Their main drawback, however, is that 
they are inherently fixed and do not en-
courage owners of motor vehicles to use 
them less frequently and intensely. 
Payments that are collected «at the toll 
gate» (the moment the service is provided). 
Such payments have the biggest potential 
to have a regulatory impact on the behav-
ior of car owners. When the fee is paid ex-
actly at the moment when the consumer 
gets access to road infrastructure, it may 
change their travel behavior and even dis-
courage them from using their own car. 
In this situation the behavioral effect may 
prove even stronger than the fiscal one 
(as is the case with the parking fee). The 
number and application of such payments 
should inevitably expand along with the 
growth in car ownership rates.
6. Classification by purpose of vehicle 
use. This classification is important for the 
sake of the analysis of tax payments that 
are associated with private or commercial 
use of a motor vehicle. Extra taxes should 
be levied on commercially used vehicles 
(passenger vehicles, trucks) in addition to 
taxes that are levied on the use of personal 
cars. Taxes on financial results serve the 
purpose. These are taxes on business ac-
tivities. They are viewed as the tax price 
that is paid for running a passenger trans-
portation business. In Russia, taxes on 
financial results include income tax, the 
single tax on imputed income, and the 
transport operator license fee.
Functions of transport taxation
We believe that all payments that form 
the system of transport taxation should 
fulfill the following functions:
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1. Fiscal function, i.e. to have a signifi-
cant distributive and allocative potential. 
It is about giving the transport taxes the 
ability to correct the market failure in the 
area of financial resourcing of construc-
tion and repair of roads. The market fails 
to ensure the development and use of the 
road network on the principles of individ-
ual retribution and equivalence. This task 
is taken over by the state and is solved by 
introducing a group of transport taxes. 
With the help of transport taxes govern-
ment should accumulate a significant 
portion of the financial resources of the 
population and businesses in the budget 
and target these resources to focus on the 
development of the road network. Ac-
cordingly, the fiscal purpose of transport 
taxes should ensure the targeted provision 
of financial resources to road construction 
funds, and these resources should be suf-
ficient for road construction. In addition, 
all users of the road network should par-
ticipate in its funding.
2. Regulatory function, i.e. to have 
a significant regulatory and behavioral 
potential. In an aspect of the implemen-
tation of this function, transport taxes 
should encourage economic agents to be 
environmentally responsible while using 
motor vehicles. There should be an effort 
to buy a car of a higher ecological class 
and use fuel of higher ecological class. 
Transport taxes should not discourage 
the desire of economic agents to use vehi-
cles. This rule should be more common in 
countries where the main mean of trans-
portation is a car.
Through the simultaneous implemen-
tation of fiscal and regulatory functions, 
the transport taxes embody the idea of 
double dividend, where environmentally 
oriented behavior of car owners will be 
accompanied by the formation of stable 
revenue sources for road construction and 
environmental protection.
The need to address the regulatory 
function of the transport fees and the use 
of fiscal instruments for the promotion 
of environmentally-oriented behavior of 
producers and owners of vehicles and re-
lated products is recognized by most ana-
lysts and researchers [10; 17; 19].
Principles  
of optimal transport taxation
When building up a system of trans-
port taxation, both state and car owners 
would, of course, like their country to 
have optimal transport taxation.
An optimal system of transport taxa-
tion is the one in which interests of all enti-
ties and beneficiaries of transport taxation 
are aligned in the best way possible, while 
the negative effects of transport taxation 
are minimized, and the positive ones are 
maximized.
The theory of optimal taxation ad-
dresses the problem of establishing a 
structure of taxes on various goods (ser-
vices). The structure of taxes is crucial for 
generating a set amount of revenue to fi-
nance government while reducing ineffi-
ciency to a minimum, i.e. minimizing the 
excess burden of taxation as posited by 
A. Harberger [20]. Consequently, the crite-
rion of reducing the excess burden of taxa-
tion should be the target for designing the 
transport taxation system. The principles 
on which the system is built should also be 
based on the above criterion. We shall out-
line the principles of an optimal system of 
transport taxation as follows.
1. Benefit principle. The key principle 
that transport taxations build on is the 
benefit principle. The use of transport en-
tails the consumption of two key types of 
public goods: the road network and the 
environment. There are, therefore, two 
things that are critical for identifying pri-
vate benefits from paying transport taxes. 
Transport taxation based on the benefit 
principle requires that taxes are perceived 
as a tax price for using the road network. 
The tax rate should represent the tax cost 
of road construction and maintenance. 
Transport taxes should also be consid-
ered as a way of internalizing negative 
externalities of car use [6; 9]. In this case, 
the size of transport tax payments should 
also reflect the tax cost of negative exter-
nalities so that the car owner rather than 
the whole community pays for mitigating 
them, which is in line with the «user pays» 
principle [7]. 
For each car owner, transport tax pay-
ments should, therefore, be equal to a sum 
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of two components: tax price of using the 
road network and the tax cost of negative 
externalities of using the car. 
It is much easier to translate the first 
component of the tax price into practice 
than the second one. The component re-
flecting the tax cost of road construction 
and maintenance for a specific motorist 
is most accurately represented by excise 
taxes imposed on the sale of petrol (natu-
ral gas) that are transferred to a motorway 
fund that is dissociated from the treasury. 
In this case, tax payments are directly 
linked to the amount of fuel purchased, 
with its consumption being indicative of 
the intensity of road use. Consequently, 
fuel tax is an approximate measure of ben-
efits, and by means of the tax motorists 
modify their financial contribution to road 
construction and maintenance.
The measure is approximate because 
of certain assumptions that are inevitable 
in the application of fuel tax. Most impor-
tantly, it has to be assumed that fuel tax 
is not entirely targeted and personalized. 
For example, government can spend tax 
receipts from a motorist using motorway 
A on repairing motorway B that is used 
by another motorist. The assumption pro-
duces the problem of equitably splitting 
tax receipts among road funds (the fed-
eral, regional and local ones) that finance 
interstate, regional and local roads corre-
spondingly. Besides, the tax does not re-
veal motorists’ preferences as regards new 
road construction. 
The second component of the tax 
price is much harder to employ in prac-
tice because the negative externalities are 
numerous [21]. Specifically, among the 
negative costs of growing car ownership 
is recurring traffic congestion, higher road 
accident rates, growing neglect of parking 
regulations, the shrinking of pedestrian 
and recreational spaces to allow for big-
ger roads and parking lots, increasing air 
pollution, deterioration of people’s health 
and mental disorders in motorists [22]. 
These effects are differentiated as per size 
and territories. 
At the same time, it is quite difficult 
to link all types of negative externalities to 
a certain fiscal charge. The easiest option 
would be identify the key negative exter-
nalities and associate each of them with a 
corresponding fiscal charge. It is desirable 
to make sure that the size of payments 
charged reflects the specific contribution 
that each car owner makes to generat-
ing negative externalities in a particular 
territory, which by itself is hard enough 
[6; 10; 19].
2. Principle of comprehensiveness. 
An optimal system of transport taxation 
should be designed as a comprehensive 
system that includes two different groups 
of taxes. Its comprehensiveness should 
show through the inclusion of Pigov-
ian taxes that it takes into account nega-
tive externalities, and Ramsey taxes that 
quantify the benefits of car owners from 
owning a vehicle. Under the above clas-
sification, fixed payments which do not 
depend on the intensity of car use should 
follow the Ramsey taxation pattern, while 
variable payments which depend on the 
intensity of car use should be based upon 
the Pigouvian tax model. 
The implementation of the principle 
of incorporating tax price in the size of 
variable transport taxes proves to be dif-
ficult because the number of negative 
externalities caused by cars grows along 
with an increase in car ownership. In Ta-
ble 1 we highlight various types of exter-
nalities brought about by motor vehicles. 
The effects are hard to measure and are 
differentiated by size and uneven in time 
and space. 
According to European scholars, 
an optimal system of transport taxation 
should address the following externali-
ties in order of priority. First of all, it is 
necessary to deal with the issue of road 
congestion: when transport-related pay-
ments are used for regulating the de-
mand for the road network, it will make 
it possible to balance the demand against 
the throughput of the road network. In 
order to address the task, both variable 
and fixed taxes could be effectively used 
as the latter restrict the spread of car 
ownership. 
When the throughput of the road net-
work is sufficient and the problem of road 
congestion does not exist, variable trans-
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port taxes could be used to offset external 
effects that are associated with the mainte-
nance and management of transport and 
road infrastructure, to fund emergency 
services, to prevent airborne and noise 
pollution, etc.
3. Differentiation principle. Under 
Harberger’s formula, the excess burden of 
taxation increases proportionately to the 
price elasticity of either supply or demand 
for a good or service. This means that if 
two goods or services are both taxed at the 
same rate, the one with higher price elas-
ticity of demand will bear a heavier excess 
burden of taxation [20]. This rule must 
be taken into account when introducing 
differentiated rates of fixed and variable 
taxes in different areas.
The price elasticity of demand for 
transportation goods and services is 
rather high in the case when the area has 
a well-developed public transport net-
work. In this situation a hike in transport 
taxes leads to lower demand for trips by 
car and a considerable increase in the 
demand for public transport services. 
The excess burden of taxation will be 
minimal in the case of a well-developed 
public transport network. If public trans-
port is uncompetitive in terms of price 
and quality of services, the price elastic-
ity of demand for transportation goods 
and services will decrease considerably. 
In this case, situation occurs when an in-
crease in transport taxes will not bring 
down the intensity of car use, while the 
overall excess burden of taxation will in-
crease [13; 23]. 
4. Principle of payment collection at 
time of service. The point of payment col-
lection should be as close as possible to 
the place where externalities occur, that 
is, it should be as close as possible to the 
location where transport infrastructure is. 
This idea serves as a major aspect of the 
optimization of the variable component 
of transport taxes. It sends the right price 
signals to car users who adjust their be-
havior, trying to reduce costs of car use as 
much as possible. The system of variable 
transport taxes can therefore encourage 
car owner to use his or her car (or discour-
age them from doing so) during certain 
time periods and in certain areas. If it is 
necessary to increase the discouragement 
effect on car owners, the number of pay-
ments charged at the time of service («at 
the toll gate») should grow. If car owners 
do not have to pay anything at the time of 
service, they develop a neutral attitude to 
the intensity of vehicle use, which makes 
the population of the area more cars de-
pendent. 
5. Principle of designation. A grow-
ing tax burden can cause discontent 
among car owners. It has to be noted 
that revenue from transport taxes must 
be spent exclusively on transport-related 
purposes. When designating transport 
taxes to a specific purpose it is extreme-
ly important to make sure that they are 
strictly assigned to a specific local gov-
ernment budget. Fixed part of transport 
taxes can be remitted to federal road 
funds, while the variable part should be 
a source of funding for road funds in the 
area where it is collected and where it 
shapes public opinion. The spending of 
money from road funds should be care-
fully examined from the point of view of 
technical necessity, priority and public 
appropriateness. 
6. Principle of social optimum. The 
systemic nature of transport taxes should 
become an essential prerequisite for build-
ing an optimal system of transport taxes. 
The system of transport taxes consists of 
separate elements and is at the same time 
part of a higher tier system of government 
transport policy. The system of taxes can-
not, however, deliver the expected effect if 
it is not supplemented with an appropri-
ate pricing policy for public transport, a 
vast and well-developed public transport 
network, administrative bans and restric-
tions, etc.
The search for a social optimum 
in traffic allocation was pioneered by 
J. G. Wardrop [24]. In 1952, he studied 
an equilibrium distribution of public and 
private transport flows within a section 
of a road network. The point of equilib-
rium was determined by comparing to-
tal disutility (total costs) of all travellers. 
Wardrop proved that when each road 
user chooses their preferred means of 
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Figure 4. A combination of transport policy measures aimed  
at shifting equilibrium of individuals’ preferences towards  
the social optimum (SO)
transport, this choice is not socially op-
timal (Fig. 4).
The passenger flow P moves along 
the abscissa to the right for the A-curve 
(total expenses of a motorist) and from 
right to left for the T-curve (total ex-
penses of a public transit passenger). In 
an ordinary situation, the dependences of 
aggregate costs on the density of the traf-
fic flow for private and public transport 
intersect at point IE.
The point is the equilibrium point of 
individuals’ preferences. A number of 
city dwellers (PA) decide to travel by au-
tomobile, while another part (PT) of them 
prefer public transport (РА > РТ). The ag-
gregate expenses of all city dwellers are 
given by the area of the triangle restricted 
by line T1.
V. Vuchic [25] argues that individu-
als’ preferences as to the means of trans-
port are pretty stable. Despite any swings 
of the preferences, urbanites will eventu-
ally return to the point of equilibrium. In 
order to move the equilibrium point to the 
left towards the social optimum and en-
sure the stability of the new combination 
of individuals’ preferences it is necessary 
to simultaneously take a set of measures. 
It is necessary to implement incentives 
encouraging the use of public transport. 
At the same time, it is necessary to adopt 
measures to discourage the use of private 
transport.
If any of the sets of measures is ad-
opted in isolation, the structure of the 
passenger flow will change insignifi-
cantly. For example, if incentives are 
provided for the development of public 
transport only, the T-curve will shift to 
the position T1, while equilibrium will 
move to the point B. The time of travel 
Journal of Tax Reform, 2016, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 193–207
205
ISSN 2412-8872
will change only a little and there will 
be a certain growth in the number of 
public transport users. If only measures 
discouraging the use of private cars are 
introduced, effects will be insignificant 
either, with the A-curve moving to the 
position A1. Equilibrium will move to 
the point C.
Only combined adoption of all mea-
sures of transport policy ensures a shift of 
the both curves, while equilibrium moves 
to the social optimum point (SO) that 
has a completely different set of param-
eters. There, passenger flows are almost 
equally divided between public and pri-
vate transport (РА ~ РТ), while aggregate 
expenses of all urban dwellers who use 
both private and public transport are sig-
nificantly reduced. The social optimum 
can, therefore, be defined as the point SO 
where total expenses of all road users are 
minimized.
A city public transport system that 
governs itself and functions in accordance 
with the laws of the market ensures equi-
librium of individuals’ preferences at the 
level IE. Such a system is less effective in 
all cases and generates bigger negative 
effects than a regulated transport system 
that provides targeted incentives and dis-
courages various preferences towards the 
social optimum SO [26].
Specific ways that each urban ag-
glomeration works out in order to shift 
the curves of preferences for private and 
public transport towards the social opti-
mum should become the foundation of a 
long-term transport policy.
Conclusion
A hyperactive development of the 
private car fleet that serves personal needs 
calls for theoretical innovations in the field 
of transport taxation. Scholarly investiga-
tions of optimal transport taxation will 
prove highly relevant in the mid-term run 
as theoretical works on the subject are ex-
tremely scarce.
We consider the following concepts 
theoretically proven. 
The price of the planned trip will 
be the key choice factor, so taxes and 
charges levied upon the trip will have the 
greatest influence on changing the travel 
behaviour of car owners. Transport taxes 
and charges are not essentially homoge-
neous; they have different impacts on 
the behaviour of car owners. Similarly 
to fixed and variable costs, it is useful to 
divide mandatory transport charges into 
fixed and variable ones. High rates of 
variable taxes have the greatest effect on 
people’s current travel behaviour. Urban 
agglomerations in Europe actively use 
variable taxes such as fuel excise duties, 
toll charges, vignettes, congestion charg-
es, distance-based electronically collected 
tolls, toll lanes, paid parking. In Russia, 
only fuel excises have found wide appli-
cation, while paid parking and road tolls 
are only starting to be introduced. The 
process, however, is extremely slow and 
meets strong opposition from car owners. 
There are no examples to be cited of con-
gestion charges and distance-based road 
tolls in Russian urban agglomerations. 
The fiscal burden of fuel excises is insig-
nificant.
Russian urban territory must de-
velop new fiscal instruments that would 
meet the following fundamental require-
ments: 
– toll revenues must be spent strictly 
on the objectives of transport policy in the 
urban agglomeration where the road sys-
tem was used; 
– tolls must be levied according to the 
distance and be related to the type of the 
road (federal, regional or municipal); 
– the charge should vary depending 
on the day of the week and the time of 
the day (the highest during peak hours 
and a minimal charge during the rest of 
the day); 
– the minimal charge should match 
the marginal costs of road use, while 
the maximum rate should also include a 
surcharge. The surcharge would balance 
demand for the road network and its ca-
pacity.
Russian urban territory must adopt 
radically new approaches to long-term 
transport planning. It is necessary to in-
troduce programs of public transport de-
velopment and rail transit development in 
the first place.
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